The Coalescence Approach to Inequivalent

Representation: Pre-QM∞ Parallels by Jacobs, Caspar
The Coalescence Approach to Inequivalent
Representation: Pre-QM∞ Parallels
Caspar Jacobs
Accepted for publication by the British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science on 21-03-2021. DOI: 10.1086/715108.
Abstract
Ruetsche [2011] argues that the occurrence of unitarily inequiv-
alent representations in quantum theories with infinitely many de-
grees of freedom poses a novel interpretational problem. According
to Ruetsche, such theories compel us to reject the so-called ‘ideal of
pristine interpretation’; she puts forward the ‘Coalescence Approach’
as an alternative. In this paper I offer a novel defence of the Coa-
lescence Approach. The defence rests on the claim that the ideal of
pristine interpretation already fails before one considers the peculiar-
ities of QM∞: there are pre-QM∞ parallels to coalescence. Despite
this departure from pristinism, the ‘modest’ view that emerges poses
no threat to scientific realism.
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1 Introduction
In Interpreting Quantum Theories [2011], Laura Ruetsche argues that the
occurrence of unitarily inequivalent representations in quantum theories
with infinitely many degrees of freedom poses a novel interpretational prob-
lem. According to Ruetsche such theories, jointly labelled ‘QM∞’, compel us
to reject the so-called ‘ideal of pristine interpretation’, which draws a sharp
distinction between laws and initial conditions. Ruetsche puts forward her
‘Coalescence Approach’ as an alternative. Although this proposal has been
recognized as standing at the centre of Ruetsche’s book,1 it has not received
much attention in the literature.2 Instead, discussions have focused on the
relative merits of various ‘pristine’ interpretations of QM∞.
3 In this paper I
offer a novel defence of the Coalescence Approach. The defence rests on the
claim that the ideal of pristine interpretation already fails before one consid-
ers the peculiarities of QM∞: there are pre-QM∞ parallels to coalescence,
from classical and statistical mechanics to ‘ordinary’ QM. I thus propose to
extend Ruetsche’s criticism of the pristine ideal (which I detail below) by
drawing attention to the problems it faces in these different contexts.
I do so by distinguishing between a ‘modest’ and a ‘radical’ version of the
Coalescence Approach. I argue that the modest version of the Coalescence
Approach suffices both for the pre-QM∞ examples I discuss and for one of
Ruetsche’s main case studies, the phase structure of the ferromagnet. The
significance of this distinction lies in its consequences for scientific realism.
Ruetsche claims that the Coalescence Approach invalidates the No Miracles
Argument for scientific realism. I point out that this is only the case if
1See reviews by Friederich [2013]; Wallace [2014].
2Lupher [2008] and Baker [2016] are the only notable exceptions that I know of.
3For example, Kronz and Lupher [2005] defend so-called ‘Universalism’, of which Baker
[2009, 2016] favours a ‘tempered’ version. Feintzeig [2016, 2018a,b] offers various argu-
ments in support of ‘Algebraic Imperialism’. I am not aware of any advocates of ‘Hilbert
Space Conservatism’.
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one adopts the radical Coalescence Approach. Its more modest version is
compatible with realism. Since the latter suffices for all of the cases discussed
in this paper, the demise of the pristine ideal poses no threat to realism.
The plan is as follows. In §2, I summarize the ideal of pristine inter-
pretation. In §3, I explicate Ruetsche’s Harmony principle, which sets
the standards for successful theory-interpretation. §4 recaps the threat that
QM∞ poses to the pristine ideal. In §5, I detail Ruetsche’s alternative, the
Coalescence Approach. In §6, I draw the distinction between the modest
and radical version of the Coalescence Approach. Then, in §7, I discuss
pre-QM∞ cases of coalescence, drawn from classical mechanics, classical
statistical mechanics and ordinary quantum mechanics. §8 connects these
issues to the status of scientific realism, and §9 concludes.
2 The Ideal of Pristine Interpretation
Following Bas van Fraassen and Ruetsche, I take it that an interpretation
answers the questions: ‘[u]nder what conditions is this theory true? What
does it say the world is like?’ (Van Fraassen [1991, 242]; see also Ruetsche
[2011, 7]). Ruetsche explicates the process as follows.4 In the ‘syntactic
stage’, an interpreter specifies the mathematical states and observables. In
the ‘semantic stage’, she assigns specific physical quantities to the observ-
ables, and hence constructs a map from the set of states into the space of
possible worlds. The image of this map determines the physical possibili-
ties.5 Ruetsche’s notion of a ‘kinematic pair’ is helpful here: a kinematic
pair has the form (S,O), where S is a set of states and O a set of observ-
ables. Ruetsche’s (controversial) core claim is that no single kinematic pair
can capture the content of QM∞.
An interpretation cleaves the space of possible worlds in two: some
worlds are physically possible, others are physically impossible. An inter-
pretation is ‘pristine’ when this cleaving satisfies the following conditions:6
1. Unimodality. There is a single concept of physical possibility that
applies equally to all states in S;
4This account is slightly simplified; see Ruetsche [2011, Ch. 1] for details.
5There are two sorts of possibilities that states can represent. On one option, they
represent possible instantaneous states of the world. On the other, they represent possible
world-histories. There is no reason to categorically prefer one option over the other. In
this paper, I will consider states which represent instantaneous possibilities and mostly
set aside dynamical considerations.
6Although Ruetsche does not explicitly state these conditions, they are based on her
description of pristinism in Ruetsche [2011, 4].
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2. Loftiness. (S,O) is independent of (a) contingencies and (b) con-
textualities.
An interpretation is unimodal when there is an unambiguous distinction
between the physically possible and the physically impossible: there is no
room for ‘degrees’ of possibility. Loftiness imposes the requirement that
interpretations are independent of what Ruetsche calls ‘geographical fac-
tors’, such as initial conditions or particular applications. I will discuss the
difference between contingencies and contextualities in more detail below.
What drives the ideal of pristine interpretation is a distinction between
laws and initial conditions:
The class of what applies in all settings where T applies includes
T ’s laws [...]; the class of what changes from setting to setting
includes initial/boundary conditions, as well as practical consid-
erations parochial to the settings which give rise to them. To
adhere to the ideal of pristine interpretation is to invoke only
considerations from the former class when circumscribing the
collection of worlds that are possible according to T . [Ruetsche
2011, 4]
The laws here include non-dynamical relationships, such as commutation
relations. This distinction between laws and initial conditions depends on
a clear concept of what remains constant across physically possible worlds.
When the ideal of pristine interpretation is violated, this distinction becomes
blurred.
3 The Harmony Principle
Ruetsche argues that pristine interpretations of QM∞ fail. But in order
to know whether an interpretation fails, we need to know what its success
conditions are. It is therefore worthwhile to discuss these conditions in some
detail.
Ruetsche bases her success conditions on a principle she calls Harmony:
Harmony. (S,O) is an admissible kinematic pair for a theory
only if (i) to each lawlike relationship posited by the theory there
correspond elements of O standing in that relationship, and (ii)
S includes all and only states instantiating the relationships in
(i). [Ruetsche 2011, 143]
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Ruetsche states Harmony as one principle, but it is useful to break it down
into its constituent components. This yields the following set of conditions:7
1. O-completeness: If some physical observable O is physically relevant,
then there is an element of O that represents O.
2. S-completeness: If a relation L between elements of O is a law, then
all states in S instantiate L;
3. S-soundness: If all elements of S instantiate L, then L is a law.
The point of O-completeness is clear: it guarantees that there are enough ob-
servables to express the physically relevant facts, which includes the theory’s
laws. S-completeness and S-soundness express a relation between lawhood
and necessity. The idea of S-completeness is that laws are physically neces-
sary and so hold true in all physically possible states. Conversely, if there
is a state in which some law-like relationship does not hold, then the latter
does not count as a law. S-soundness, on the other hand, claims that the
laws are laws in virtue of the fact that they hold true across all states, and
hence if all physically possible worlds instantiate some fact, then that fact is
ipso facto a law. The intuition here is that contingent generalizations such
as ‘there are no golden mountains’ aren’t laws exactly because there is some
physically possible world in which there are golden mountains.
It is tempting to also posit the converse of O-completeness:
4. O-soundness: If an element of O represents a physical observable O,
then O is physically relevant.
The motivation for O-soundness is to arrive at a minimal set of observables,
which contains only those observables that are relevant for the characteriza-
tion of the physical system in question. However, O-soundness is not entailed
by Harmony, and there are a couple of questions one may have. Firstly, it
isn’t entirely clear when an observable is physically relevant—and without a
clear account of such relevance, it seems presumptuous to use O-soundness
to remove observables from our theories. Secondly, it is not obvious that it
is a theoretical vice to have irrelevant observables, since those observables
7My terminology is meant to evoke principles of logical soundness and completeness:
the mathematical relations between observables on mathematical states are ‘syntax’,
whereas the relations between physical quantities in possible worlds are ‘semantics’. S-
soundness says that we can move from facts about the former to facts about the latter,
and S-completeness says that we can move in the reverse direction.
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could simply exist as a result of the overall mathematical structure of our
theory. For example, the existence of a momentum observable p̂ and a po-
sition observable x̂ entails that there exists an observable p̂ + x̂. But this
latter observable seems physically uninteresting; it is only there because the
addition of operators on a Hilbert space is well-defined. For these reasons, I
will only use O-soundness as giving us a provisional, but not decisive, reason
against having available certain observables.
4 Phase Structure: Threat to Pristinism
In this section, I will outline Ruetsche’s main argument against the ideal
of pristine interpretation, the ‘Coalesced Structures Argument’ [Ruetsche
2006, 2011]. Ruetsche’s claim is that no pristine interpretation of quantum
statistical mechanics can account for the phenomenon of phase structure.
This motivates her preferred alternative, the Coalescence Approach. Let me
emphasize that all of the arguments discussed below (except, perhaps, the
one against Hilbert Space Conservatism) are to some extent controversial.
It is not my aim here to defend all of Ruetsche’s claims; rather, the purpose
of this section is merely to motivate the consideration of the Coalescence
Approach as an alternative to the pristine interpretations that Ruetsche
criticizes.
The Coalesced Structures Argument focuses on phase structure. Phase
structure is exemplified by ferromagnets, such as iron, which exhibit spon-
taneous magnetization below a certain critical temperature. We can model
the ferromagnet as a spin chain by defining operators σni,j,k that represent
the canonical anti-commutation relations (CARs). The Jordan-Wigner the-
orem guarantees that for a finite system, this representation is unique up
to unitary equivalence, so we can consider different representations of the
CARs as mere notational variants (cf. Clifton and Halvorson [2001]). Now,
a statistical system with finite DOFs has a unique equilibrium state.8 How-
ever, the equilibrium state of the Heisenberg model of the ferromagnet is
degenerate, due to the rotational symmetry of its Hamiltonian. Therefore,
we must represent the ferromagnet as an infinite spin chain. In this context,
the Jordan-Wigner theorem fails. For example, one representation of the
CARs starts with a basis state in which the spin at all sites is +1 along the
z-direction, and then adds further basis states which differ from the first at
finitely many sites. Call this representation (H+, S+). But this represen-
8Where this is understood as a state that satisfies the so-called KMS condition; see
Ruetsche [2003, §3] for details.
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tation is not unique: we could equally well have started with a basis state
in which all spin values are −1 along the z-direction. We then get an al-
ternative representation of the CARs, (H−, S−). Crucially, (H+, S+) and
(H−, S−) are unitarily inequivalent representations (UIRs). This presence
of UIRs spells trouble for pristine positions.
4.1 Hilbert Space Conservatism
The first pristine position we discuss is ‘Hilbert Space Conservatism’, which
claims that all quantum theories are Hilbert space theories: states are identi-
fied with positive, normalized trace-class operators T +1 (H) on an irreducible
Hilbert space representation H of the CARs, and observables are identified
with bounded, self-adjoint operators BSA(H). Faced with UIRs, the Hilbert
Space Conservative has to choose one sole representation of the CARs as the
bearer of physical content. The problem is that this violates S-soundness,
which says that only the laws hold true across all possible states. Since all
states on an irreducible representation of the CARs are polarized in the same
direction, Hilbert Space Conservatism implausibly implies that it is a law-
like fact in which direction a ferromagnet is polarized. Ruetsche puts it well:
z(H−, S−) and (H+, S+) constitute distinct and rival theories of the infinite
spin chain: the set of worlds possible according to the first theory includes
none where the polarization is directed in the positive z direction; the set of
worlds possible according to the second theory includes only worlds where
the polarization is so-directed. Supposing both sorts of polarization are pos-
sible, neither (H+, S+) nor (H−, S−) can give the theory of the infinite spin
chain’ [Ruetsche 2006, 480].
4.2 Algebraic Imperialism
According to a second approach, ‘Algebraic Imperialism’, observables are
self-adjoint elements A of a C*-algebra A, and states are linear maps ω :
A 7→ C such that ω(A) is the expectation value of A in state ω. The algebra
A delineates a structure that is shared by all Hilbert space representations,
and so SA (the set of states over A) does contain states polarized in different
directions. However, Ruetsche argues that Algebraic Imperialism violates
O-completeness, the requirement that any physical quantity that figures in
the laws is amongst the theory’s observables. The reason is that there are
nets of observables that converge in the weak operator topology of H, but
not in the norm topology natural to A; such observables are ‘parochial’ to
particular Hilbert spaces. Crucially, the polarization observable m̂ is one
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of these parochial observables. But the phenomenon of phase structure is
characterized through macroscopic observables such as m̂: in the param-
agnetic phase m̂ = 0, while in the ferromagnetic phase m̂ 6= 0. Polariza-
tion observables are also essential to characterize the lawlike phenomenon of
universality: the description of phase transitions in terms of critical expo-
nents. Algebraic Imperialism seems unable to account for these aspects of
phase structure. However, there are some possible responses. For instance,
Feintzeig [2018a] has recently argued that Algebraic Imperialism does have
access to parochial observables when extended to A’s bidual A∗∗. So whether
Ruetsche’s argument indeed succeeds remains the subject of debate.
4.3 Universalism
‘Universalism’ proposes a more inclusive representation: the universal en-
veloping Von Neumann algebra, πU (A)
′′, which is the weak closure of the
direct sum πU of the Hilbert space representations of all A-states (via the
so-called GNS construction). Since states over A are represented as normal
states on πU (A)
′′, the Universalist has access to the same states as the Alge-
braic Imperialist. Furthermore, Feintzeig [2018a] has shown that there are
observables on πU (A)
′′ that correspond to the parochial observables. How-
ever, many of these observables are physically irrelevant to characterize the
actual state of a system, and so Universalism seems to fail O-soundness.
Baker [2016] expresses (but does not endorse!) this point:
Consider any two inequivalent, irreducible subrepresentations of
the large representation. The parochial observables native to one
subrepresentation will provide no physical information about the
states of the other subrepresentation’s folium. So these parochial
observables play no role in describing the vast majority of the
theory’s states. And since every irreducible subrepresentation
has its own family of parochial observables, that is a lot of surplus
structure!
Recall that O-soundness motivates us to find a minimal set of observables
that characterize some physical system. The problem for Universalism is
that parochial observables on different subrepresentations seem irrelevant
to the system’s actual state, whereas a restriction to the irreducible rep-
resentation of that state gives us just those parochial observables that are
physically relevant for that state. Now, it may seem as if the universal rep-
resentation also has a physically relevant observable native to it, namely the
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universal polarization observable—which we can think of as the sum of all
parochial polarization observables. But in fact, it is only the projection of
this observable onto the subrepresentation of the system’s actual state that
is relevant to the system’s actual state , and this just is that subrepresen-
tation’s parochial polarization observable. On the other hand, the universal
polarization observable’s projection onto other subrepresentations does not
tell us anything about the system of interest, so there is a sense in which
Universalism doesn’t give us a minimal set of actually relevant observables.
As I mentioned in §3, it remains controversial whether O-soundness in-
deed captures a genuine notion of physical redundancy. Moreover, even if
Universalism fails O-soundness it is unclear how much of a problem this
really is: surely too many observables are still better than too few? So I am
aware that the above arguments has serious limits. In any case, Ruetsche has
another argument, which is perhaps more persuasive: the ‘W*-argument’.
The upshot of the W*-argument is that Universalism fails S-completeness,
which says that all states instantiate the laws. For there are certain Hamil-
tonians which fail to converge in the norm topology of A, but which do
converge in the weak operator topology of some states’ GNS representation.
However, this convergence only holds for some states over A. If the Univer-
salist considers all states over A as physically possible, she includes states
that don’t admit of a dynamical evolution. The dynamics therefore wrongly
fail to qualify as lawlike. In order to be more selective one has to consider
‘geographical’ factors that pertain to the particular dynamics of the system,
contrary to Loftiness. But the W*-argument is also open to critique. For
example, Feintzeig [2018b] discusses methods for constructing alternatives
C*-algebras that do satisfy S-completeness. As with Algebraic Imperial-
ism, then, these arguments at best motivate a consideration of Ruetsche’s
alternative approach, without offering decisive reasons in its favour.
5 The Coalescence Approach
Ruetsche’s verdict is clear: the interpretative strategies discussed above fal-
ter because of their pristinism. Each decides on a kinematic pair ‘a priori,
before the messy business of applying the theory in question to individ-
ual problems begins’ [Ruetsche 2011, 146]. We can diagnose the issue as
follows: S-soundness and O-completeness pull in the direction of admitting
more states and observables, whereas S-completeness and O-soundness push
us towards fewer of both. However, which states and observables are rele-
vant depends on ‘geographical factors’. Pristine interpretations either ignore
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those factors entirely or focus on a particular set of factors a priori. We need
an approach that balances these demands.
Ruetsche puts forward an unpristine alternative:
The doctrine of unpristine interpretation allows that the contin-
gent application of theories does not merely select among some
preconfigured set of their contents, but genuinely alters their
contents. It follows that there can be an a posteriori, even a
pragmatic, dimension to content specification, and that physical
possibility is not monolithic but kaleidoscopic. Instead of one
possibility space pristinely associated with a theory from the
outset, many different possibility spaces, keyed to and config-
ured by the many settings in which the theory operates, pertain
to it. Following Kadison, I call this the coalescence approach to
interpreting physical theories. [Ruetsche 2011, 147]
As it stands, this Coalescence Approach (CA) needs further spelling out.
The remainder of this section offers one such account.9
Recall that pristine interpretations put forward a single kinematic pair
that carries a theory’s content. By contrast, the CA has an (at least) two-
tiered account of possibilities. The first tier consists of a sole, primitive
kinematic pair which represents a broad space of physical possibilities. The
second tier consists of a ‘kaleidoscope’ of kinematic pairs, each indexed to
one or more geographical factors. Because of its two-tieredness, the CA vi-
olates Unimodality, which holds that there is a unique notion of physical
possibility that applies equally to all states. Moreover, the CA also vio-
lates Loftiness, which demanded that such factors play no role in theory-
interpretation, because the second tier possibilities are indexed to geograph-
ical factors. So the CA radically departs from the pristine ideal.
The key idea behind Ruetsche’s Coalescence Approach, as I understand
it, is that there is a ‘division of labour’ between the two tiers such that each
tier fulfils distinct success conditions. The broad kinematic pair at Tier 1
satisfies O-completeness and S-soundness: it contains all observables one
could need, and enough states to avoid contingent generalizations. The ele-
ments of Tier 2, on the other hand, satisfy O-soundness and S-completeness:
they contain a minimal set of relevant observables, and few enough states
to sustain the laws. The Coalescence Approach aims to avoid the prob-
lems that beset the ideal of pristine interpretation through this division of
9For another attempt at spelling out Ruetsche’s position, see Lupher [2008, §5.6]. I
borrow some elements from his set-up, including the Tier 1/Tier 2 language.
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labour. Rather than fulfilling all success conditions at once, the Coalescence
Approach delegates different duties to different kinematic pairs.
In more detail, Ruetsche recommends that we allow Tier 1 to range over
the space of all algebraic states, SA, which represent ‘the worlds possible
according to the theory in the broadest sense’ [Ruetsche 2011, 290]. In an
earlier paper Ruetsche [2003] suggests that we can also use the universal
representation πU (A)
′′ at Tier 1. The normal states on πU (A)
′′ are identi-
cal to the states over A, so on that score the difference is irrelevant. But
the latter has access to parochial observables which the former lacks, and
this is significant. Pace Ruetsche, I believe that it is essential to have these
observables available at Tier 1. Recall that the reason for preserving the
full set of states SA at Tier 1 is to ensure the truth of counterfactuals such
as: ‘if the external magnetic field had had a different value, the ferromag-
net would have been polarized in a different direction’. As it stands, SA
lacks the resources to express those counterfactuals, because they involve
parochial observables. On the other hand, Feintzeig [2018a] proves that
there are operators on the universal representation that correspond to the
parochial observables [Feintzeig 2018a, Prop. 5]. Their expectation value is
as expected on their ‘own’ subrepresentation, and zero otherwise. Further-
more, Feintzeig argues that a reasonable extension of Algebraic Imperialism
to the bidual A∗∗ allows the latter access to the same observables (Prop.
2). If we accept this extension, Imperialism and Universalism are in fact
equivalent up to *-isomorphisms (Prop. 3). Therefore, I recommend that
the appropriate Tier 1-pair is either the universal enveloping Von Neumann
algebra or the C*-algebra as extended in the way Feintzeig suggests.
Tier 2, on the other hand, ‘does take contingencies into account’. From
SA or πU (A)′′ one selects a more narrow space of states ‘relevant to the appli-
cation at hand’. As Ruetsche writes, ‘other algebraic states aren’t impossi-
ble; they’re simply possibilities more remote from the present application of
the theory [...]’ [Ruetsche 2003, 1340]. While focusing on a particular space
of states, one also ‘coalesces’ a set of observables with them. For example,
we can construct the GNS representation of the ferromagnet’s actual state ω,
close in the weak operator topology and so obtain the relevant parochial ob-
servables. Again, ‘observables confined to von Neumann algebras parochial
to less relevant representations aren’t once and for all unphysical. They’re
just inadequate to the sorts of discriminations demanded by the application
at hand’ [Ruetsche 2011, 290]. In this sense the GNS representation coa-
lesces a ‘minimal’ set of observables most relevant to the particular state
of the system. There are two reasons for this restriction. The first is to
describe the system of interest in the simplest terms possible: the CA sees
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simplicity as a theoretical virtue (cf. Ruetsche’s [2011, §15.4] invocation of
Humean accounts of laws). The second is to allow for certain explanations
of phenomena in terms of natural laws: sometimes a relation only appears
lawlike from the space of Tier 2 states, so an interpreter who appeals to that
relation’s physical necessity requires this more restricted possibility space.
In this way, the Coalescence Approach supports a theory’s explanatory as-
pirations.
In sum, the lenient representation at Tier 1 allows us to claim that
distinct polarizations are physically possible, whereas the restricted repre-
sentation at Tier 2—sensitive to a posteriori factors—hones in on the states
and observables most relevant to the actual state of the ferromagnet. On
my reading of the Coalescence Approach, then, it is this division of labour
that allows us to avoid the choice of a single kinematic pair that either has
too few states and/or observables, or contains non-dynamical states and/or
irrelevant observables.
6 Modest and Radical
The ‘geographical’ factors that determine a Tier 2-representation come in
two kinds. The first are contingencies, or initial conditions. Roughly, ini-
tial conditions vary across worlds but are constant within them, whereas
context also varies within a possible world. The latter includes the goals,
applications and aspirations of scientists. We can thus draw a distinction
between a ‘modest’ and a ‘radical’ CA:
Modest CA: The interpretation of a theory depends on contingent facts
about the target system’s state, but not on the context in which the
theory is used.
Radical CA: The interpretation of a theory depends on contingent facts
about target system’s state and on the context in which the theory is
used.
On the modest CA, the set of states S depends on initial conditions: possibil-
ity is indexed to possible worlds. For example, whether a certain ferromag-
net is in its paramagnetic state at time t differs across worlds, but is fixed
within each world. Therefore, the appropriate Tier 2-representation of a fer-
romagnet is fully determined by its actual state. On the radical CA, on the
other hand, the state of a system does not fully determine its interpretation.
Instead, the same system admits of different interpretations—different kine-
matic pairs—that depend on factors external to the system itself. Of course,
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there is a sense in which a system’s state itself may depend on external fac-
tors. For example, a scientist may purposefully prepare a ferromagnet in its
+ state with some particular application in mind. However, the claim that
interpretations depend on context is not a causal but a supervenience claim.
Whatever it was that caused the ferromagnet’s actual state, the modest CA
demands that its kinematic pair fully supervenes on that state, whereas the
radical CA allows that other facts play a role in the determination of what
is physically possible to that system.
In Ruetsche’s terms, the modest CA naturalizes physical possibility,
whereas the radical CA also pragmatizes physical possibility:
When physical possibility is naturalized, sets of physically possi-
ble worlds are indexed with respect to the ‘anchor’ world whose
facts shape that set. When physical possibility is pragmatized,
sets of possible worlds are indexed (or indexed as well) to circum-
stances of application within the ‘anchor’ world. When physical
possibility is pragmatized, there’s a single way the world is, but
(as gleaned by physics) there isn’t a single set of ways it might
be. [Ruetsche 2011, 353]
As the above quote illustrates, Ruetsche is sensitive to these differences, but
she does not explicitly distinguish between the above two versions of the CA.
It is clear that Ruetsche would prefer its radical version: ‘In slogan form,
my contention is that, when it comes to QM∞ at least, there is a pragmatic
dimension to theory articulation. What set of possible worlds we associate
with a theory of QM∞ can depend on what we’d like to do with that the-
ory: what explanations, involving which magnitudes and guided by what
laws, we aspire to; what phenomenological models we need to construct;
what projects of theory development we’d like to sponsor.’ [Ruetsche 2011,
352].10 Nevertheless, it is not always clear whether Ruetsche’s evidence for
the Coalescence Approach supports just the modest or also the radical ver-
sion. For example, the coalescence account of the ferromagnet only requires
that interpretations vary with initial conditions. As I explained in the previ-
ous section, the key idea is that a ferromagnet’s Hilbert space representation
at Tier 2 depends on its actual state, viz. its direction of polarization. If
the ferromagnet is in the + state, for example, its kinematic pair at Tier 2
is (H+,S+). There is no further need for contextual considerations. This is
10In personal communication, Ruetsche has confirmed that she identifies as a radical
coalescer.
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relevant because the modest and radical CA seem to have different implica-
tions for scientific realism. Specifically, I will argue in §8 below that the the
former is consistent with realism, pace Ruetsche.
7 Pre-QM∞ Coalescence
I now come to the main claim of this paper: that there are analogues of
the (modest) Coalescence Approach for pre-QM∞ theories. I will consider
three examples in this section. The first derives from classical mechanics
and concerns the choice of an N -dimensional phase space. The second ex-
ample constructs the Past Hypothesis in statistical mechanics as a case of
coalescence. The third and final example considers unitarily inequivalent
representations in ‘ordinary’ quantum theories (that is, quantum theories
with finitely many DOFs), illustrated by the Aharonov-Bohm effect. In each
instance, my claim is that the way we interpret these theories runs counter to
the ideal of pristine interpretation. The Coalescence Approach, meanwhile,
aptly accounts for our interpretational practices. Pace Ruetsche, then, I
claim that the tensions in the pristine ideal are already apparent before one
considers QM∞. Moreover, we will see that in each case the modest CA
suffices to account for the way we interpret these theories, an observation
that will become relevant in the next section. Let me stress that the below
examples do not rule out the radical CA, but rather suggest that appeals to
context are not required in order to satisfy the adequacy conditions on in-
terpretation encoded in Harmony via a ‘division of labour’. As I will show
in the next section, this means that these examples of pre-QM∞ coalescence
do not immediately threaten realism.
7.1 Classical coalescence: phase spaces
In classical mechanics, we represent a system of n point-like masses in three-
dimensional space on a 6n-dimensional phase space, isomorphic to R6n:
points of phase space correspond to possible states of the system. I will
sketch some pristine interpretations of classical phase spaces below, but I
warn from the outset that these positions may seem trivial and perhaps
even silly. But that’s exactly the point: pristine interpretations of classical
mechanics are ‘extremist’ and ill-suited to physical practice. The classical
analogue of the Coalescence Approach, on the other hand, offers a natural
account of our use of classical phase spaces.
As our first extremist we can imagine a ‘Phase Space Conservative’
who, analogous to her quantum counterpart, privileges a single phase space
14
amongst all others, for instance R6N for some particular N . Since all states
on R6N represent classical worlds with N bodies, Phase Space Conservatism
implies that those worlds are the only physically possible ones. But re-
call that S-soundness says that only the laws hold true across all states,
and surely it is not a law that there are N bodies in the universe! Just
as Hilbert Space Conservatism erroneously implied that any particular fer-
romagnet only could have been polarized in the direction in which it is
actually polarized, Phase Space Conservatism cannot account for the fact
that a classical universe could have contained either more or fewer bodies
than it actually does.
Alternatively, we can envisage a ‘Classical Universalist’, who proposes
that the disjoint union of phase spaces,
⊔
n∈NR6n, is the correct arena for
classical mechanics (perhaps we could think of this space as a ‘classical Fock
space’).11 This space is an immensely complex mathematical structure: one
can use it to represent classical states for any n ∈ N. The problem with
Classical Universalism is that it is extremely unparsimonious. Suppose, for
example, that the actual universe contains ten bodies, so that its state lies
on a subspace of the universal phase space isomorphic to R60. But the uni-
versal phase space also contains observables that are inapplicable to states
on R60, such as the position of the eleventh particle or the momentum of the
thirteenth. These observables are defined over R66, or R78. Therefore, Clas-
sical Universalism violates O-soundness, just as the (quantum) Universalism
discussed in §4.3 does. But while the excess observables of the universal en-
veloping Von Neumann algebra were, perhaps, justifiable as by-products of
otherwise physically meaningful structure, this is not the case here: there
is no sense in which
⊔
n∈NR6n is the ‘natural’ arena of classical mechanics
as applied to the actual universe. Classical Universalism’s redundancy of
observables motivates an alternative approach.12
In practice, physicists simply use the phase space which is most applica-
ble to the system at hand, but pristine interpretations cannot easily account
for this fact.13 The Coalescence Approach offers a better model of these
11I will not discuss classical analogues of Algebraic Imperialism. Feintzeig [2016] con-
structs an algebraic version of classical field theory, but this construction is irrelevant for
our purposes as the focus of this subsection is on particle theories with varying N .
12Baker [2016] objects that this argument simply ‘amounts to the observation that, on
a universalist-style view, physically contingent facts have a significant role in determining
which physical quantities [...] provide physically significant information’. But this misses
the point, which is exactly that Universalism, unlike the CA, is not sensitive to the way
in which contingent facts determine which observables are most significant.
13An anonymous reviewer has suggested that the pristine ideal can model physical
practice in terms of idealizations. But it is not clear to me whether the restriction to
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practises. The idea is that at Tier 1, the classical coalescer has phase spaces
for all n at her disposal. This accounts for the fact that different particle
numbers are physically possible, in accordance with S-soundness. The ‘ex-
cess’ observables are necessary at this level to express such counterfactuals.
On the other hand, Tier 2 selects the particular phase space that matches
the number of DOFs of the system under study. As a result, the kinematic
pair at Tier 2 only contains observables that directly bear on said system.
This representation thus satisfies O-soundness. This is the same division of
labour that I described in §5. Therefore, the CA is a more natural account
of our use of classical phase spaces, as it avoids both a too restrictive notion
of physical possibility and a too liberal account of observables. Instead, it
affirms the fact that physicists are not limited to the use of a single phase
space, but choose opportunistically between them.
Moreover, this employment of the CA is modest in the sense that it
only appeals to contingent facts about the number of DOFs of a particular
system. Of course, the practising coalescer may still use different phase
spaces to model different sub-systems of the universe. But this is not an
example of context-dependence as outlined in §6, since in each case the
appropriate choice of phase space is fully determined by the physical state
of the system of interest. This is not to say that context could never play a
role in theory-interpretation. I will discuss potential limits to my claim that
the modest CA suffices in the next section.
Before I move on to the second example, let me consider an important
disanalogy between the polarization observable m̂ and the particle number
n. While n is a conserved quantity, m̂ is not—the latter, after all, varies
in phase transitions. Therefore, one may object that while the same ferro-
magnet could have been polarized in different directions, it is not the case
that the same system could have had a different number of DOFs. This is a
difficult issue which seems to depend on intuitions: to me, it seems possible
that, say, the solar system could have had one fewer planet while still being
the same system. Similarly, our universe as a whole could have contained
one less particle than it actually does, but still count as the same universe
(or, at least, as our universe’s other-worldly counterpart). Of course, there
are limits: it is unlikely that the free particle could have been a tiger. And
there is significant vagueness, too: Theseus’ ship is (arguably) still Theseus’
ship when one of its ores is removed, but perhaps no longer when the mast
a particular phase space amounts to an idealization: an idealization usually ignores or
distorts some actual features of the system, whereas a particular choice of phase space
dismisses some of the system’s possible states.
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and hull are replaced. Putting that aside, the fact that there are no dy-
namical transitions between different values for n does not establish that
a particular value of n is essential to a system, in the de re sense that a
system must have the same number of particles in all worlds in which it
exists. Therefore, I believe that the cases are sufficiently analogous for the
parallel to hold.14
7.2 Statistical mechanics: emergence as coalescence
A different example of the Coalescence Approach in pre-QM∞ action is
the Past Hypothesis in statistical mechanics. In brief, the fact that the
laws of statistical mechanics are symmetric under time reversals seems to
contradict the asymmetry of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which
states that entropy (probably) increases with time. In order to account for
this asymmetry, the ‘Past Hypothesis’ (PH) is postulated: the entropy of
the universe at the Big Bang was (sufficiently) low. This postulate ensures
that the Second Law holds for future times [Albert 2000].
Since we are considering dynamics, it is useful to consider trajectories
rather than points on phase space. Pristine interpretation then comes down
to an a priori circumscription of allowed trajectories; the imposition of the
PH in effect amounts to selecting only those trajectories with a low initial
entropy as physically possible. But pristinism faces the following dilemma.
On the one hand, if the Second Law is indeed a law, then S-completeness
demands that all (or at least most) trajectories through phase space in-
stantiate it: hence we impose the PH. On the other hand, the PH seems
a contingent fact—the universe could have had a higher initial entropy.15
So imposing the PH violates S-soundness, the principle that some fact is a
14There are also more realistic examples, which I lack the space to discuss in detail. One
class of examples concerns the phenomenon of ‘geometric phases’. The crux is that when
some quantity µ, such as angular momentum, is conserved, it is often fruitful to treat µ
as a parameter with a constant value c. One then constructs the ‘reduced phase space’ of
a system, which contains just those points for which µ = c. The dynamics on the reduced
phase space Pµ non-trivially depend on the value of µ. As in the examples above, it is
neither wise to assert the primacy of a unique reduced phase space, thereby ruling out
counterfactual values of µ as physically impossible, nor to insist on the full structure of
the universal phase space, which contains excess degrees of freedom with respect to the
actual dynamics of the system. Instead, different systems call for different choices of Pµ,
as the CA advocates. I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this example.
15This is true, for example, on Lewis’ [1973] version of the best systems account, which
only counts generalizations as candidates for lawhood. On the other hand, Callender
[2004] argues that the Past Hypothesis is a (non-dynamical) law. I won’t further discuss
this issue here.
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law when all states instantiate it. Therefore, pristinism cannot fulfil both
S-soundness and S-completeness simultaneously.
The Coalescence Approach avoids this dilemma with its familiar division
of labour. Let Tier 1 consist of all possible trajectories, including those
not instantiating the PH, and suppose that Tier 2 is indexed to particular
trajectories on Tier 1. If the Second Law holds in the actual world, then
Tier 2 includes only those trajectories which also instantiate the PH. From
a Tier 1 perspective, then, the PH is a contingent fact, analogous to the
polarization of the ferromagnet or the number of bodies in the universe.
But since the PH holds true in our world, there are some trajectories which
are ‘more’ physical than others. These low-entropy trajectories are coalesced
at Tier 2, which thus represents the Second Law as a law. According to the
CA, the Second Law is a law relative to our world: in a universe which starts
out in equilibrium, for example, Tier 2 will also contain trajectories which
fail to instantiate the Second Law. But this is correct, since the Second Law
in a sense ‘emerges’ from the laws of statistical mechanics in combination
with a particular low-entropy initial condition. Therefore, the Coalescence
Approach offers a novel understanding of the reduction of thermodynamics
to statistical mechanics. Moreover, which trajectories are most physical
clearly depends solely on the initial condition of the actual world. It follows
that here too the modest CA suffices to account for the Second Law.
As Baker [2016] points out, the Past Hypothesis is not the only instance
of such emergence:
[I]f one is convinced that the postulates [such as the PH] are
laws, and that it is important in other explanatory contexts (for
example, ones appealing to time-reversal symmetry) to suspend
these postulates, then coalescence is everywhere in physics.
I agree with this assessment: the Coalescence Approach is essential to under-
standing pre-QM∞ theories. In addition to thermodynamics, Baker men-
tions retarded electromagnetic waves; the time-asymmetric processes de-
scribed in Wallace [2017], such as radioactive decay, allow a similar analysis.
These considerations further confirm this section’s point that the Coales-
cence Approach is not a radical departure from, but a familiar feature of
scientific practice. The application of coalescence to other cases of emergence
is a fruitful avenue for further research.
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7.3 Quantum mechanics: bead on a wire
The final example is perhaps closest to the occurrence of UIRs in QM∞. For
an infinite number of DOFs is only one way in which the Stone-Von Neumann
and Jordan-Wigner theorems can fail. These theorems also fail for finite
systems whose configuration spaces are non-simply connected. I will discuss
a rather simple example, namely the bead on a wire. But this example
is a simplified version of the Aharonov-Bohm effect. Earman [2019, 2010]
suggests that it ‘would be interesting to compare this case [the Aharonov-
Bohm effect] to the cases in QFT and the thermodynamic limit in models of
phase transitions where there is also a choice among unitarily inequivalent
representations’; this subsection carries out that comparison. The exposition
follows Ruetsche [2013]; for connections to the Aharonov-Bohm effect, see
Landsman [1990], Belot [1998] or Earman [2019].
Consider a bead constrained to move on a circular wire. In polar coordi-
nates, its state is parametrized by the variables φ and ω, which represent the
angular position and momentum respectively. However, φ is discontinuous
at φ = 2π, which hinders the process of quantization; a better choice of vari-
ables is x = cosφ, y = sinφ and ω. Due to the constraint that x2 + y2 = r2,
the configuration space is just the circle S1. Since ω ∈ R, the phase space of
the bead on the wire then is S1×R. In order to see the connection with the
Aharonov-Bohm effect, think of the bead as an idealized charged particle;
its phase space is non-simply connected because the particle moves around
an infinitely long impenetrable solenoid, which thus removes the z-axis from
configuration space.
To quantize this theory, we require a set of commutation relations. These
are what Ruetsche calls the ‘Circular Canonical Commutation Relations’ or
CCCRs:
[x, y] = 0 [ω, x] = iy [ω, y] = −ix
In order to find a Hilbert space representation of the CCCRs, we need both
a Hilbert space and operators that act on it satisfying these relations. The
appropriate Hilbert space is L2(S1), the space of square-integrable functions
ψ(φ) : S1 → C. The (wave)function ψ assigns a complex number to each
point of the bead’s configuration space. As our observables we can choose:
x̂ = cosφ ŷ = sinφ ω̂ = i
d
dφ
It is easy to show that these observables satisfy the CCCRs. However,
this quantization is not unique. In fact, any choice ω̂θ = i
d
dφ + θ, where
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θ ∈ [0, 1], satisfies the CCCRs. In other words, any choice of θ yields a
different representation of the CCCRs. Furthermore, these representations
are unitarily inequivalent. The reason is that the spectra of ω̂θ and ω̂θ′ for
θ 6= θ′ are distinct. Specifically, the spectrum of ω̂θ is {2π(n − θ)}, where
n ∈ Z. We thence have a one-parameter family of UIRs.
In order to connect this to the Coalescence Approach, recall that ω̂
represents angular momentum. Therefore, different representations of the
CCCRs deem different angular momentum values physically possible. This
poses now-familiar problems for our pristine approaches. For Hilbert Space
Conservatism, the physically possible values of angular momentum are lim-
ited to those within the spectrum of a single choice for ω̂θ. This limitation
conflicts with our intuition that the bead could have had any angular mo-
mentum. Moreover, in the Aharonov-Bohm effect the value of θ depends
on the magnetic flux through the solenoid: different values of θ result in
empirically distinct interference patterns on the screen. Therefore, the Con-
servative’s a priori restriction to a unique choice for θ rules out a whole
class of experimentally detectable phenomena, in violation of S-soundness.
Universalism, on the other hand, claims that the direct sum of these rep-
resentations is the correct setting for ordinary QM. This implies that angular
momentum operators of all representations are physically significant, even
though the actual value of ω̂ always lies within the spectrum of one of its
representations. The excess of observables may violate O-soundness: just as
polarization observables of different representations are irrelevant to the ac-
tual state of a ferromagnet, so different angular momentum observables are
irrelevant to the actual momentum of the bead on the wire. Furthermore,
there is a sense in which Universalism violates S-completeness, analogous
to the W*-argument. Recall that one can represent the time-evolution of
a quantum system either as a family of *-automorphisms on A, or via a
Hamiltonian that acts on Hθ. The latter depends on the choice of represen-
tation for the angular momentum observable: different representations yield
different Hamiltonians. This is the case for the particle in the Aharonov-
Bohm effect [Landsman 1990; Earman 2019]. Now, consider a system with
angular momentum ω̂. The dynamics for this state are given by Ĥθ, the
particular Hamiltonian that acts on Hθ. But this Hamiltonian is parochial
to the irreducible subrepresentation πθ, and so there is a sense in which the
universal representation contains dynamically irrelevant (or less relevant)
states. Put differently, the Hamiltonian Ĥθ corresponds to the projection
of a unitary evolution operator Ĥ onto the subrepresentation Hθ. But it is
the restriction of this Hamiltonian to Hθ that we are ultimately interested
in, so Universalism seems to give us more than we care about. In sum, the
20
Universalist cannot draw a distinction between those representations of the
system’s time-evolution that are dynamically distinguished and those that
are not.16 It is this distinction that requires us to attend to geographical
factors.
The Coalescence Approach, meanwhile, advocates flexibility. The Tier
1-representation is the universal one, which allows for states of all possible
angular momenta. The Tier 2-representation then hones in on a particular
ω̂θ, and so sheds physically irrelevant content. This choice is not made once
and for all, but depends on the actual state of the physical system. In
the Aharonov-Bohm effect, for example, this choice is determined by the
magnetic flux through the solenoid, which has observable consequences for
the interference pattern. The CA avoids the issues discussed in the previous
paragraph. Firstly, the CA coalesces a particular representation of ω̂ as
physically most relevant, in accordance with O-soundness. Secondly, the
CA also coalesces a particular representation of the dynamical evolution
as most relevant to the actual system. In this sense, the CA offers us a
better account of the relation between the dynamics at the algebraic and
the representation level, since it allows for the fact that at Tier 2 there exists
an empirically distinguished representation of the family of *-automorphisms
at Tier 1. Finally, as with the previous examples, this is an instance of the
modest CA: interpretation depends on contingent facts, such as the value
of θ, but not on contextual factors. Again, my claim is not that this rules
out the radical CA, but that at least in the first instance the radical CA
is not required to account for the bead on the wire. As I show in the next
section, this means that a coalescence account of ordinary QM is consistent
with scientific realism. I will postpone a discussion of the potential limits of
this claim to the same section.
8 Realism Restored
I have mentioned several times that what is at stake in this debate is the
status of scientific realism. Specifically, Ruetsche [2011, §15.3] argues that
the ‘No Miracles Argument’ (NMA) presupposes the ideal of pristine inter-
pretations, so the Coalescence Approach suggests a move away from real-
ism. However, I will argue this is at most a consequence of the radical CA.
16Neither can Algebraic Imperialism fully account for this distinction, since the Hamil-
tonian ‘may depend explicitly on the parameter ω labelling the representation πω of the
quantum algebra’ [Landsman 1990, 15]. The distinctions between representations that
Imperialism disavows are thus empirically highly significant.
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The modest CA, on the other hand, is consistent with—indeed supports—
scientific realism. Since the examples discussed above all seem to utilize
the modest CA, I maintain that it is far from clear that the demise of the
pristine ideal is a threat to realism.
The NMA argues that the success of our theories warrants belief in their
(approximate) truth. Ruetsche rightly points out that the NMA concerns
the success and truth of interpreted theories. After all, un-interpreted the-
ories have no physical content: they do not ‘say what the world is like’.
Therefore, the truth of an (interpreted) theory is inferred from its success
under the same interpretation. For example, if Everettian QM is successful
in some way, then this supports the truth of QM under the Everett interpre-
tation, but not the Bohmian one. For our purposes here, an interpretation
consists of a pair of possibility spaces: one for each of the two tiers of the CA.
So, what the realist is realist about are the notions of physical possibility
that these spaces encode: whether a state of affairs is physically possible—
in either the broad Tier 1 sense or the narrow Tier 2 sense—is supposed to
be an objective matter of fact. I will argue that the modest version of the
CA is consistent with the claim that these notions of physical possibility are
objective.
On the Coalescence Approach, theories have no unique interpretation.
Instead, interpretations may depend on geographical factors. Specifically,
the possibility space at Tier 2 varies with context and/or initial conditions.
Supposing that all these interpretations are roughly equally successful, the
dilemma for realism is this: either each interpretation is individually suc-
cessful enough to merit the status of approximate truth, or none are. In
the first case, the NMA generates contradictory conclusions: it implies that
the theory is true on each successful interpretation. But these interpreta-
tions disagree on which worlds are physically possible—that’s what makes
them distinct interpretations! Since the realist asserts that physical possibil-
ity is an objective notion, these contradictory commitments are worrisome.
The second option is not much better: if geographically adulterated inter-
pretations are not individually successful, the NMA finds no application
at all. This means that there simply is no reason to believe that the the-
ory’s possibility spaces are objective. As Friederich [2013] notes: ‘Given
the importance and tremendous success of quantum theories, this challenge
to scientific realism deserves serious consideration. Due to the clarity of
Ruetsche’s formulation of it the stage is well set for the realists to come up
with their rejoinders.’
But whether Ruetsche’s argument is valid depends on how we construe
the CA. If we only accept the modest CA, the problem for scientific realism
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does not arise. The modest CA enables us to give a single (albeit adulter-
ated) interpretation of QM∞. This interpretation depends, as we have seen,
on the initial conditions of the actual world. But all this means is that sci-
entists in different worlds have different commitments, and this is no threat
to realism. After all, realism claims that the success of our theories justi-
fies the belief that our world is one of that theory’s models. For example,
realism about the coalescence account of classical phase spaces discussed in
§7.1 implies two commitments: (i) a commitment to the physical possibil-
ity of different particle numbers in the ‘broad’ sense relevant to our modal
intuitions, and (ii) a commitment to the physical necessity of the system’s
actual particle number in the ‘narrow’ sense relevant to the most simple
characterization of its state. Realism is compatible with the modest CA in
the sense that neither of these commitments varies within possible worlds,
although the second commitment does vary across possible worlds.
On the other hand, the radical CA is indeed susceptible to Ruetsche’s
dilemma. According to this version of the CA there is no single interpreta-
tion of a theory to which all of its theoretical virtues accrue, even within our
actual world. Instead, there are competing interpretations with distinct and
conflicting metaphysical commitments. Which interpretation is (approxi-
mately) true depends on the context. In particular, it is context-dependent
which states are physically possible in the narrow sense of Tier 2. There-
fore, Tier 2-possibility is not an objective notion, but a mind-dependent
construct. This presents a clear conflict with scientific realism. Now, it may
seem as if this conclusion is an artifact of the way we have construed what
counts as an interpretation of a theory. Suppose that an interpretation con-
sisted not just of two possibility spaces, one of which varies with context,
but of a possibly infinite collection of kinematic pairs, each of which is rel-
evant in a different context. In that case, context does not determine what
is physically possible: it merely directs our attention to a different notion of
physical possibility. But the problem with this suggestion is that one can-
not simply call a kinematic pair a possibility space; one also has to justify
what particular notion of physical possibility this kinematic pair encodes.
And, crucially, this justification cannot itself appeal to context, for then
said notion of physical possibility is not sufficiently objective. For instance,
I have couched the Tier 1/Tier 2 distinction in terms of the soundness and
completeness principles of §3. Without a similar justification for their novel
possibility concepts, the advocate of the radical CA remains committed to
notions of physical possibility whose role in the theory depends on our sub-
jective interests.
In conclusion, the modest CA is consistent with scientific realism. Since
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the examples of §7 only seem to require the modest CA, realism is safe
from Ruetsche’s threat. However, this conclusion clearly rests on the as-
sertion that the modest CA is sufficient to account for pre-QM∞ cases of
coalescence. In closing, then, let me consider some limitations of this claim.
Firstly, I want to stress that the modest CA does not exclude context from
science altogether. It may very well be that our goals, applications and
aspirations determine some particular possibilities as especially relevant to
us. For example, suppose that I desire to study the effect of certain values
of small variations of ω̂ around some fixed value ω̂0. I may then consider
the direct sum of representations for just those values of ω̂ close to ω̂0. But
this only contradicts the modest CA if it is additionally claimed that this
sum corresponds to some novel notion of physical possibility. In that case,
physical possibility depends on context. But there simply is no reason to
believe that: the fact that we are interested in some particular representa-
tions does not elevate them to scientific concepts. So, the modest CA is not
inconsistent with the commonplace claim that context plays some role in
scientific representation.
But the above discussion does hint at a more worrisome scenarios for
the coalescence realist, namely a scenario in which some notion of possibil-
ity that does carry metaphysical weight depends on context. For example,
consider our representation of the solar system. If we are interested in the
period of Jupiter around the Sun, it does not do much harm to idealize the
heavenly bodies as point masses, so that we can represent the system on an
(6×8)-dimensional phase space. But if we are interested in whether Jupiter
and the Sun will collide, we must take their radii into account. This adds
eight additional degrees of freedom to our theory, and hence we must use
a (7 × 8)-dimensional phase space. The problem now is that both of these
phase spaces lay claim to a notion of physical possibility that licenses cer-
tain scientific explanations, for example of Kepler’s laws. But they disagree
on which states are physically possible: in particular, the first phase space
literally says that it is impossible for the planets to have a non-zero radius.
So, what is physically possible (in the narrow sense) seems to depend on
what we are trying to explain. The bad news is that I have no easy answer
to this challenge, and so the practice of idealization—which seems essential
to science—poses a serious threat to realist interpretations of the modest
CA. But the good news is that idealization in any case raises difficult ques-
tion about the relation between possibility and explanation. For example,
Bokulich [2011] argues that idealized models only represent certain ‘real pat-
terns of structural dependencies in the world’. If that’s true, then perhaps
idealized phase spaces are not intended to represent possible states of affairs
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at all, but rather certain structural patterns. This attenuates the conflict
with realism, since it means that distinct kinematic pairs merely represent
different such patterns instead of mutually inconsistent possibilities. How-
ever, I admit that this response is somewhat sketchy: further research into
the interplay between coalescence and idealization is required in order to
decisively settle this question.
9 Conclusion
The story Ruetsche tells is that the ideal of pristine interpretation holds
sway until one considers the UIRs that occur in QM∞. On the contrary,
I have argued that the pristine ideal struggles to account for our interpre-
tational practices even in pre-QM∞ scenarios, from classical and statistical
mechanics to ‘ordinary’ quantum mechanics. Rather than an ideal, then,
pristine interpretation is a simplistic—or, in Ruetsche’s terms, ‘extremist’—
caricature. The Coalescence Approach more accurately covers the tolerance
and opportunism of physics. There simply is no good reason to restrict our-
selves a priori to one particular phase space: different facts call for different
physics. These considerations ultimately support the Coalescence Approach.
Since this heterodox view has so far received little attention, its details re-
quire further investigation. I have made a start by drawing a distinction
between the modest and radical versions of the Coalescence Approach. As
I have argued, the former is most conducive to scientific realism. The fact
that modest coalescence suffices in the pre-QM∞ contexts I have discussed
as well as in the example of phase structure thereby moderates some of
Ruetsche’s more radical pronouncements.
However, although the ferromagnet is certainly one of Ruetsche’s main
cases for the Coalescence Approach, it is not her only one. It remains to be
seen whether other case studies require the Coalescence Approach’s more
radical version. Since the main point of this paper was to draw attention
to analogues of the Coalescence Approach in pre-QM∞ theories, I will not
consider these further examples in detail here. But the distinction between
the modest and radical Coalescence Approach exactly affords us the possi-
bility to ask the question which of these cases support the former, and which
(if any) the latter. As I have argued, the answer to this question will have
important ramifications for the status of realism and the laws of nature.
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